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Abstract 
Reforms often occur in waves, seemingly cascading from country to country. We argue that 
such reform waves can be driven by informational spillovers: uncertainty about the outcome 
of reform is reduced by learning from the experience of similar countries. We motivate this 
hypothesis with a simple theoretical model of informational spillovers and learning, and then 
test it empirically using an approach inspired by the gravity model. We find evidence of 
informational spillovers both with respect to both political and economic liberalization. While 
the previous literature has focused only on economic reform, we find that the spillovers are 
particularly important for political changes.  
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1. Introduction 
Political and economic changes tend to occur in waves, in a pattern sometimes described as 
the domino effect: changes initiated in one country spread to other countries. Examples of this 
phenomenon in the political domain include the events of 1848 in Europe, emergence of new 
independent countries from the ruins of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires in the late 19th 
and early 20th century, decolonization following the end of the 2nd World War, 
democratizations in Latin America in the late 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, 
and most recently the so-called Arab Spring in the Middle East and the Occupy movement in 
Western countries.1 On the economic front, we can observe similar waves, such as the 
liberalization and privatization waves during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Reform 
spillovers can be observed also with respect to less dramatic changes. The ban on smoking in 
restaurants and bars, adopted in Ireland in 2004, has since spread to most European countries. 
Eastern Europe, on the other hand, has experienced similar legislative spillovers with respect 
to the adoption of the flat tax, first introduced in Estonia in 1994.2 
We argue that reform waves, such as the preceding examples, are fuelled by informational 
spillovers. The outcome of a reform is inherently uncertain. Reversing an already-
implemented reform, furthermore, is costly. Uncertainty about the reform outcome combined 
with costly reversal may cause efficiency-enhancing reforms to be postponed or not 
implemented at all: a phenomenon referred to as the status-quo bias (Fernandez and Rodrik, 
1991, see also Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Individuals (and governments), however, can infer 
important signals about the likely outcome of the reform by observing similar reforms 
elsewhere. If the reform turns out to have positive repercussions in one country, other 
countries become more likely to implement the same reform; a negative outcome in one 
country can stop the reform in its tracks in other countries too.  
To illustrate how this phenomenon might work, we formulate a simple theoretical model of 
political economy of reform with inter-country informational spillovers. The model yields 
testable predictions which we then subject to an empirical analysis. We look at the post-
communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (with our data spanning the period from 
the beginning of reforms in these countries until the onset of the recent economic and 
                                                 
1 Note that these reforms need not necessarily imply a change for the better. For example, the recent Arab Spring 
arguably has lead to an islamization rather than democratization of the affected countries.  
2 In both cases, the innovation originated outside Europe. The smoking ban was introduced in various US 
jurisdictions about a decade before its introduction in Ireland. Hong Kong, similarly, has had a flat tax for 
decades before its adoption in Estonia.  
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financial crisis, i.e. 1990-2008). We consider the post-communist countries because of two 
reasons: (1) the vast majority of them at least attempted economic and political reforms 
during the period in question, and (2) this group of countries displayed a great deal of 
variation in the depth and outcomes of reforms implemented. While much of the literature on 
the relationship between reforms and uncertainty has been written with economic reforms in 
mind, we expect spillovers to apply to political and economic reforms alike. We thus measure 
reforms using indexes of democratization and economic liberalization. Our empirical findings 
strongly suggest that informational spillovers indeed have played a role in facilitating 
economic and political changes in these countries. The spillovers with respect to the latter 
appear particularly prominent.  
In the next section, we discuss the related literature on the role of uncertainty in determining 
the success of reforms and on spillovers or contagion effects in reforms. In section 3, we 
formulate a simple model showing how informational spillovers can reduce uncertainty and 
foster reforms. We then move on to our empirical analysis which is motivated by the theory. 
In section 4, we outline the data while in section 5 we discuss our methodology. We present 
our main findings in section 6. The last section summarized the main conclusions.  
 
2. Related literature  
The relationship between uncertainty and reform success has been explored extensively in the 
literature motivated by the reforms (and their failures) in Latin America and Easter Europe 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) coined the term status-quo bias to 
describe the situations when countries fail to implement reforms that are expected to increase 
overall welfare. They argue that this is due to uncertainty about the distribution of costs and 
benefits of the reform. In particular, it is possible that a reform that benefits the majority of 
the population ex post is nonetheless rejected ex ante because, in the presence of uncertainty, 
the expected value of the payoff from implementing it can be negative for some voters. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), similarly, show that uncertainty about the distribution of benefits 
and costs of reforms can lead to inefficient delays due to war of attrition. Dewatripont and 
Roland (1992a,b; 1995) consider aggregate rather than individual uncertainty. They point out 
that reforms implemented gradually rather than in a big-bang fashion are more likely to 
succeed because their piecemeal implementation partially resolves the underlying uncertainty 
about their eventual outcome. If reform reversal is costly, gradualism allows the voters to 
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receive a signal about the outcome of the full reform early on. Depending on the signal, they 
can either continue to implement the remainder of the reform or reverse the initial reform to 
return to the status quo. Doing the latter avoids having to reverse the full reform, which is 
more costly than reversing a partial reform.  
More recently, Holder (2012) formulates a model motivated by the Arab Spring process. He 
argues that the outcome in different countries depends on two factors: the oil wealth of the 
dictator, and whether the regime originates from an ethnic or religious minority group or from 
the majority. Accordingly, oil rich dictators who stem from the majority group will seek to 
avoid political change by increasing public spending (as happened in Saudi Arabia), rich 
minority-group governments would resist the change militarily (Libya and Syria), while poor 
majority dictators concede defeat (Tunisia and Egypt).  
The preceding contributions consider reforms in one country in isolation from what might be 
going on elsewhere.3 Yet, the notion that reforms or policies in one country can affect 
outcomes elsewhere is not new. This process has been denoted, variously, as snowballing 
(Brezis and Verdier, 2003), contagion (Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla, 2008, and Campos and 
Horvath, 2006), and learning (Meseguer, 2006). Most of this literature, however, considers 
primarily economic reforms and ignores similar waves of political liberalization. A partial 
exception is the model by Brezis and Verdier (2003) who argue that democratization in a 
neighboring country makes it easier for repressed citizens to emigrate. That, in turn, reduces 
the ability of the dictator to repress protest and makes political liberalization there more likely 
too, thus opening the way for economic reform.  
Gassebner et al. (2011) propose a theoretical model of reform spillovers. They argue that 
‘contagion’ of reforms emerges because of inter-jurisdictional competition due to factor 
mobility as well as because of trade between countries.4 They then test their model using data 
on a broad panel of countries, with reform measured by the index of economic freedom 
(Heritage Foundation). They find that economic reforms in other countries are indeed 
important determinants of reform progress elsewhere and that these spillovers are better 
facilitated by geographic and cultural proximity than by trade.  
Meseguer (2006) formulates a model in which policy makers use the experience of other 
countries to update their expectations on the outcome of reform in their own country through 
                                                 
3 Holder (2012) nevertheless recognized the interconnectedness of the revolts in the Middle East by suggesting 
that they were set off by a ‘window of opportunity’ for change, without specifying what constituted this window.  
4 In a related paper, Faber and Gerritse (2012) consider the impact of trade and investment flows on institutional 
quality.  
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a process of Bayesian learning. She tests this model empirically, with reform outcomes 
measured as having an independent central bank, liberal trade regime, agreement with the 
IMF and engaging in privatization. She finds evidence of learning in three out of the four 
policy areas, the exception being central bank independence.5 The analysis, however, is 
somewhat ad-hoc: some variables of interest are policies (i.e. stock measures) while others 
capture policy changes (changes/reforms of policies). Having an independent central bank and 
liberal trade regime are examples of the former while engaging in privatization (rather than 
having most productive assets in private ownership) is the latter. Having an agreement with 
the IMF, furthermore, does not necessarily capture reform but may reflect the underlying 
economic hardship that compels countries to seek assistance from the IMF. 
A closely related concept to informational spillovers is political yardstick competition. The 
concept of yardstick competition was developed by Shleifer (1985) in the context of setting 
prices for regulated firms. Crucially, it was applied to elections and political processes by 
Salmon (1987), whose work was followed by Besley and Case (1995), Ashworth and 
Heyndels (1997), Wrede (2001), Bodenstein and Ursprung (2005) and others. In a nutshell, 
this model predicts that in the presence of asymmetric information, voters cannot easily 
determine whether economic outcomes (e.g. the size of budget deficit) is to be attributed to 
politicians’ actions (effort, competence and/or ideological bias) or to objective economic 
circumstances (see Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). Observing outcomes in other 
jurisdictions then presents a relevant benchmark (yardstick) against which to measure their 
own government’s performance at election time.  
In the remainder of the paper, we develop a simple theoretical model of informational 
spillovers and their impact on reforms under uncertainty. We argue that this mechanism can 
be at work for economic and political reforms alike. We then test the predictions of this model 
empirically on a sample of post-communist countries undertaking both kinds of reforms.  
 
3. Model of reform, uncertainty and informational spillovers 
The fundamental problem of implementing a political or economic reform is that their 
outcome is inherently uncertain. Attempts at political change may lead to democracy and rule 
of law but they can also degenerate into political instability, infighting or open political or 
                                                 
5 Brueckner  (2000),  analyzing  welfare  reform,  similarly  argues  that  the  level  of  benefit  provision  in 
neighboring states affects policymakers’ decision on the generosity of the welfare state. 
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even military conflict. For example, consider two countries that experienced transition to 
democracy in 1989-90: Poland and Romania. Both started with broadly based and peaceful 
protests and both ended up with their countries undertaking extensive democratization and 
eventually joined the EU. The eventual trajectory and the economic and human cost involved 
were dramatically different, however.6 Similarly, the Tunisian and Libyan protests in 2010-11 
both eventually lead to the downfalls of the incumbent regimes but at dramatically different 
costs. Economic reform, likewise, can bring about economic growth and rising living 
standards or it can give rise to unemployment and run-away inflation. The contrast, for 
example, between the outcomes of economic reforms in Russia and China is especially 
poignant.  
The role of uncertainty about reforms and their outcomes has been well recognized in the 
early transition literature (see in particular Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; and Dewatripont and 
Roland, 1992a,b and 1995). The main lesson is that uncertainty can result in efficiency-
enhancing reform being postponed or abandoned altogether. Reducing uncertainty therefore is 
the key to the successful implementation of the reform. Dewatripont and Roland(1992a,b) 
show that a gradual reform leads to partial resolution of uncertainty about the outcome of the 
full reform. In their framework, a partial reform is never optimal alone but the cost of 
reversing it is lower than that of reversing the full reform. By implementing the partial reform 
first, voters obtain a signal about the outcome of the full reform. With this signal, and the 
associated reduction in uncertainty, they can make a better-informed choice whether to 
continue with the remaining reform measures or reverse those already implemented.  
We formulate a simple three-period model which builds on Dewatripont and Roland’s 
analysis with a crucial difference: in our framework, the resolution of uncertainty comes from 
observing the experience of other countries rather than from implementing the reform in a 
piecemeal fashion.7 In the two examples of political reforms mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, political transitions in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and the Arab Spring, the 
changes started in Poland and Tunisia, respectively. Both countries’ experience with the 
                                                 
6 In Poland, the large-scale protests lead to a round-table negotiation between the communist government and the 
opposition. This, in turn, opened the way for a free election, which the opposition won overwhelmingly. The 
Communist Party in turn transformed itself into a successful Western-style social-democratic party (Democratic 
Left Aliance). The Romanian government, in contrast, sought to contain and suppress the protest by calling in 
the police and later the army. The ensuing armed struggle was won by the opposition after the army switched 
sides. The last communist president, Nicolae Ceauşescu, was executed and the communist party broke up and 
disappeared. 
7 Besides Dewatripont and Roland, the model of neighborhood effects in Durlauf (2004) and the theory (and 
empirics) of political yardstick competition discussed in the preceding section are also of relevance to our model. 
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reform was relatively smooth, certainly when compared to the subsequent events in Romania 
and Libya. Had the initial country experienced a great deal of bloodshed, it is very well 
possible that no reform wave would have taken place in either region.8 
Consider country i with a continuum of risk-averse individuals. We do not model the 
interaction between the government and citizens explicitly. Instead, we assume that the 
government seeks to maximize its utility (which may include ideological motives as well as 
private rents) subject to a political constraint. The latter is embodied in the ability of the 
citizens to remove the government in a democratic election or by means of a popular unrest or 
revolt. Economic or political reforms therefore do not occur necessarily because the 
government seeks to maximize overall welfare. Rather, the government is either compelled to 
implement a reform by the prospect of its imminent removal from office, or it is toppled and 
replaced by another government that undertakes the reform. The nature of the reform again 
reflects the political constraint, which in turn is influenced by the information set available at 
the time. We believe this (perhaps cynical) view is justified in the case of post-communist and 
developing countries: reforms tend to be implemented in the wake of political upheavals and 
often end up captured by interest groups who use them to further their own objectives 
(Hellman, 1998).  
In line with the preceding discussion, we therefore focus on the nature of the political 
constraints and, specifically, on the preferences of the citizens. The agents can be 
heterogeneous but, as Dewatripont and Roland, we only consider uncertainty about aggregate 
outcomes common to all. The status quo is associated with a negative payoff; the period value 
of that payoff is –γi. This disutility can stem either from economic policies or from political 
repression in the status quo. For example, depending on context, the status quo can 
correspond to excessive state interference in the economy, distortionary taxes, tolerance of 
smoking in public places, or disregard for political rights of individuals. The status quo can be 
amended by implementing a reform. The outcome of that reform, however, is uncertain, and 
may even be worse than the status quo. Based on the information available before the reform, 
the agents form expectations about the period value of the reform’s outcome. Let E(ωi|Ii) be 
the expected value of the future payoff, ωi, conditional on the information available at present, 
Ii. For simplicity, we assume that the same payoff will accrue in every period after the 
implementation of the reform unless the reform is reversed; we therefore omit time indexes. If 
                                                 
8 Similarly, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968, both of which 
were crushed by Soviet invasions, did not set off waves of similar events elsewhere.  
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the outcome of the reform is worse than the status quo, the reform can be reversed in the third 
period; the reversal is associated with cost –ξi.9 The decision whether to maintain the reform 
or reverse it is taken at the end of the first period, after the payoff for that period is revealed 
(and incurred). If the reform is reversed, the reversal cost is incurred and thereafter the status-
quo payoff is again restored. For simplicity, we assume that the status quo payoff and reversal 
costs are not uncertain.  
Assuming no informational spillovers (autarky), the return from implementing the reform will 
be  
E(ωi|Ii) + δE(ωi|Ii) + δ2E(ωi|Ii) (1) 
in case the reform is maintained, and  
E(ωi|Ii) – δξi – δ2γi (2) 
if it is reversed. The payoffs that accrue during the second and third periods are discounted by 
a discount factor δ. 
The reform therefore will be implemented if  
E(ωi|Ii)>–γi (3) 
where Ii is stands for all the information available in country i during the first period. The 
reform will be maintained if  
ωi+ δωi> –ξi– δγi (4) 
Note that the decision whether to maintain or reverse the reform is based on the actual 
outcome, revealed once the reform has been implemented, rather than its expectation.  
Now we consider the case with informational spillovers. We assume that the outcomes of 
reforms implemented elsewhere can be observed with a lag of one period. Therefore, the 
agents in country i have an additional option: to postpone implementing the reform in order to 
observe its outcome in countries that have already implemented it. In that case, the 
information set available in country i is [Ω,Χ]. Ω is the vector of the actual outcomes in other 
countries, ω1,…,ωn while Χ is a vector of parameters χ1,…,χn depicting how similar the 
conditions in the various other countries are to the conditions in country i. This strategy 
therefore yields the payoff  
                                                 
9 The payoff of implementing the reform and the reversal costs can incorporate also external factors such as the 
economic support received from the World Bank and other international financial institutions (as well as the 
conditionality associated with such support), the prospect of EU membership, and the like.  
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–γi + δE(ωi|Ω,Χ)+ δ2E(ωi|Ω,Χ) (5) 
in case the reform is maintained, and  
–γi + δE(ωi|Ω,Χ) – δ2ξi (6) 
if it is reversed. The conditions for maintaining or reversing the reform are similar as before 
except that now this decision takes place at the end of the second rather than the first period.  
Postponing the reform is costly: it results in the negative status-quo payoff being incurred for 
one additional period. This is captured by the first term in the payoff functions (5) and (6). 
The cost of doing so, however, may be outweighed by the benefit of improving the precision 
of the expectation of the reform’s outcome in the next two periods. If the informational 
spillovers from the other countries are significant, they help avoid the potential additional cost 
of having to reverse a reform whose outcome is worse than the status quo.  
This result is similar to that of Dewatripont and Roland (1992a,b) who argue that gradual 
reform helps reduce uncertainty about the outcome. In this case, the reduction of uncertainty 
stems not from the reform being implemented gradually but from postponing it and learning 
from the experience of others. Once the outcomes of reforms implemented elsewhere are 
observed, the reform can be implemented in a big-bang fashion. However, this strategy can be 
optimal only if the cost of maintaining the status quo for one additional period is not very 
high.  
Informational spillovers such as those discussed in the model above are likely to be one 
reason why political or economic changes occur in waves, as was the case in the post-
communist countries during 1989-91 or in the Middle East during 2011. For example, the 
decision of Polish and Hungarian communist governments not to suppress the popular 
protests and then to engage in negotiations with the opposition in the spring and summer of 
1989 was likely to have been instrumental in encouraging the subsequent protests in East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia in fall of that year. Had either Polish or Hungarian government 
chosen to crack down on the protests as later happened in Romania, the enthusiasm for 
political change may well have waned throughout the region. Similarly, the positive outcome 
and the relatively low cost of political change in Tunisia in the spring of 2011 is likely to have 
encouraged the protests to be replicated throughout the Middle East. It is also not surprising 
that the remaining authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea and China, have sought to 
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suppress the spread of information about the changes in the Middle East.10  
Similarly, the countries that initiated economic reforms relatively late benefited from the 
experience of Poland and Hungary whose reforms started in 1990. The (predominantly 
negative) experience with partial economic reforms in the former Yugoslavia in the course of 
the 1980s also could have had informational value: it may have contributed to the decision of 
the subsequent reformers to shy away from piecemeal reform.  
Last but not least, the experience of other countries can help also with respect to selecting the 
toolkit for facilitating change. The use of text messages and social networks to organize 
political protests in Iran in the wake of the 2009 election was replicated throughout the 
Middle East in 2011 and is likely to have contributed to the success of those movements.11  
We therefore hypothesize, in line with our model, that the progress in political and economic 
reform should be related to the stock of similar reforms implemented previously in other 
countries.12 The intensity of informational spillovers, furthermore, is also likely to depend on 
the extent the two countries are similar: we expect the spillovers to be higher for 
geographically as well as culturally close countries.  
We test these predictions on a sample of post-communist counties during the 1990s and 
2000s. We focus on these countries because virtually all of them at least attempted to 
implement economic and political reforms during this period. The reform strategies as well as 
their outcomes, however, differed substantially across countries. This sample thus offers 
sufficient variation in reform progress, both in the economic and political domains.  
Flows of information between two countries, of course, are difficult if not impossible to 
observe. Instead, we can utilize either outcomes (such as inflation, unemployment or growth) 
or actual policies. We choose the latter even though our model is formulated with outcomes in 
mind, as qualitative assessment of outcomes of economic or political reforms is context 
                                                 
10 The government of North Korea was reported to have banned its citizens who worked in Libya under 
the  Qaddafi  regime  from  returning  (see  “North  Korea  bans  citizens  working  in  Libya  from  returning 
home,” The Telegraph, 27 October 2011. China  regularly  suppresses news about popular protests  in  its 
media, regardless of whether those protests take place in China or elsewhere. Websites such as Facebook 
and  Twitter, which  helped  coordinate  protest  in  the Middle  East  and  elsewhere,  have  been  blocked  in 
China.  Finally,  it  is  particularly  instructive  to  compare  the  results  of  searching  for  keywords  such  as 
‘Jasmine  revolution’  on  google.com  and  baidu.com:  the  two  alternative  search  engines  produce 
dramatically different lists of entries.  
11 The Chinese government has learned this lesson too. During the 2009 unrest in Xinjiang, mobile‐phone 
and internet services remained suspended for extended periods in the province.  
12 Importantly, the reform concerned can represent either an improvement or worsening of the status-quo: 
informational spillovers can foster an extension of human rights or economic liberalization or the opposite 
processes.  
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dependent. Inflation and unemployment immediately in the wake of liberalization can be a 
sign of the reform being successful, while in a different context they can symbolize failure. 
Similarly, absence of political protest can indicate expansion of political freedoms and 
democracy, or intensification of repression.  
 
4. Data 
Our analysis considers political and economic reforms that started in the post-communist 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s.13 While some 
countries implemented wide-ranging reforms relatively quickly, others proceeded more 
gradually and/or experienced set-backs and reform reversals. Correspondingly, our data cover 
the years 1990 to 2008. We use 2008 as the cut-off year to ensure that we capture the reform 
period but avoid including the current economic and financial crisis. We only consider 
spillovers among the post-communist countries and thus ignore the rest of the world. This is 
due to the fact that the experience of countries with similar starting position and undergoing 
similar changes is likely to be more relevant than the experience of established democracies 
and market economies.  
To capture the countries’ progress in implementing market-oriented policies, we use the 
average of eight progress-in-transition indicator compiled and published annually by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).14 We use the average Freedom 
House democracy index15 to take account of the progress in democratization. Finally, we 
identify periods of war using the Correlates of War (2010) dataset.  
 
                                                 
13We  include  Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Bosnia‐Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  Georgia,  Hungary,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Moldova, 
Mongolia,  Monte  Negro,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia,  Serbia,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
14 These  indicators measure each country’s progress  in  the  following  fields: price  liberalization,  foreign 
exchange and  trade  liberalization,  small  scale  privatization,  large  scale  privatization,  enterprise  reform, 
competition  policy,  banking  reform,  and  security  markets  and  non‐banking  financial  institutions.  Each 
indicators ranges from 1 (unreformed centrally‐planned economy) to 4+ (liberal market economy). As is 
common in this  literature, we replace plus and minus distinctions  by adding and subtracting 0.33 (so that 
4+  becomes  4.33  while  4‐  is  3.67).  We  do  not  use  the  more  recently  available  EBRD  indicators  of 
infrastructure  reform,  only  the  eight  original  indicators  measuring  progress  in  Washington‐consensus 
reform (liberalization, stabilization and privatization).  
15Specifically,  this  index  is  the  average  of  the  Freedom House measures  of  political  freedoms  and  civil 
liberties, rescaled so that higher values correspond to more democracy. It ranges between 1 (autocracy) to 
7 (fully free).  
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5. Methodology 
Our theoretical model predicts the existence of informational spillovers with respect to policy 
reform and also that these should decline with the distance between countries. The distance, 
furthermore, can be interpreted as not only the geographic distance but also as cultural 
proximity and/or common historical legacies. In order to take account of this, our analytical 
approach combines two well know empirical models: the spatiotemporal autoregressive 
model (STAR) and the gravity model. We start by describing the latter and then discuss how 
our approach compares to the former.  
The gravity model (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006, and the references therein) is widely 
applied in the international trade literature, where it is used to explain bilateral trade flows 
between pairs of countries (later applications use it also to analyze foreign direct investment 
and migration flows). It takes its inspiration from the theory of gravity in physics, where the 
force of gravity between two objects is defined as:16  
ܨ௜௝ ൌ ܩ
ெ೔ெೕ
஽೔ೕ
మ . (7) 
The force of gravity, F, between objects i and j is thus proportional to their masses, Mi and Mj, 
the gravitational constant, G, and inversely proportional to the square of distance between 
them, Dij,. Applied to the study of economic phenomena, the gravity model takes the 
following form (omitting time subscripts for simplicity): 
ܨ௜௝ ൌ Α
௒೔௒ೕ
൫஽೔ೕ௖௨௟௧೔ೕ൯
మ (8) 
where Fij stands for the economic flow (such as trade or migration) between two countries, i 
and j, Yi is the economic equivalent of physical mass of country i (in the context of trade and 
migration, mass can be proxied by total GDP and population, respectively), A is an arbitrary 
constant term, and, finally, the denominator collects the various distance terms, such as 
geographic and cultural distance.  
In our analysis, we wish to capture the flow of information about the outcome of policy 
reform between countries. The gravity relation (now with the time subscripts added back) 
therefore can be rewritten as follows:  
ܨ௜௝,௧ ൌ Α
௒೔,೟షభ௒ೕ,೟షభ
൫஽೔ೕ௖௨௟௧೔ೕ൯
మ. (9) 
                                                 
16 This follows Baldwin and Taglioni (2006).  
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Fij,t now stands for the informational flow or spillovers from country j to country i at time t. 
This depends on the stock of policies implemented in both countries in the preceding period, 
t-1. Specifically, in line with our theoretical model, we expect the informational spillover to 
be proportional to the stock of policies in country j and inversely proportional to the distance 
between them.  
Unfortunately, we do not observe the actual informational spillovers from country j to country 
i. Instead, we only observe the actual progress in policy reform in i that results, in part, from 
these spillovers: 
ሶܻ௜,௧ ൌ ݂ൣܨଵ,௝,௧൫ ଵܻ,௧ିଵ൯, ܨଶ,௝,௧൫ ଶܻ,௧ିଵ൯…ܨ௡ିଵ,௝,௧൫ ௡ܻିଵ,௧ିଵ൯൧. (10) 
That is, we observe the policy change in country i in period t, which is a function of the 
unobserved (latent) informational spillovers from the remaining n-1 countries. We also know 
that each of those spillovers is itself a function of the country’s own policies.17 Thus, we 
approximate the gravity relation in equation (9) by  
ሶܻ௜,௧ ൌ Α
௒೔,೟షభ௒ೕ,೟షభ
൫஽೔ೕ௖௨௟௧೔ೕ൯
మ. (11) 
In other words, we assume that the progress in policy reform in country i is proportional to the 
lagged policies in i and j and inversely proportional to the distance (geographic, cultural and 
historical) between i and j. Linearizing this relation by taking logs of both sides and using 
lower case letters to denote logs, we get  
Δyi,t = α + β1yi,t-1 + β2yj,t-1 + β3*dij + β4*contiguityij + β5*samecountryij. (12) 
The dependent variable is the log-difference in the index of policies (see below) in country i 
during period t. We consider three measures of distance/proximity: geographical distance, 
common-border dummy and a dummy for belonging to the same country in the past (former 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). Clearly, sharing common border or having 
common history should make the flow of information easier. We further augment this 
equation to include interactions between distance and reforms, to allow for the effect of 
reform in country j to vary with distance, and, finally, add dummies to account for military 
conflicts and country and year fixed effects. Our baseline regression becomes  
Δyi,t = α + β1yi,t-1 + β2yj,t-1 + β3*dij + β4*contiguityij + β5*samecountryij  
                                                 
17 In line with our model, we assume that the informational spillover occurs with a lag rather than 
contemporaneously. Therefore, we do not need to consider the possibility of simultaneous determination of 
policies in i and j. 
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+ β6yj,t-1*dij + β7yj,t-1*contiguityij + β8yj,t-1*samecountryij  
+ β9warit + β10warjt + ηi + υt + εit. (13) 
The first row collects the standard gravity variables: indexes of policies in countries i and j, 
and the various distance measures. The second row collects the interaction terms between the 
policy index in country j and the distance terms. The terms in the second row are similar to 
the spatial lags used in the STAR (spatiotemporal autoregressive) model. That model is used 
for analyses involving regional (geographic) data that are thought to display correlation of 
residuals among adjacent or nearby regions (this correlation can be contemporaneous or 
involve temporal lags).18 There are several differences between our model and the STAR 
model.  
First, the STAR model regresses the outcome of interest on the sum (or average) of all spatial 
lags. In contrast, we introduce spatial lags for each pair of countries separately. This means 
that the information pertaining to each pair is being considered and the effects of individual 
counterpart countries therefore cannot cancel out.19 In other words, our specification is more 
disaggregated than the typical STAR model.  
Second, our approach is more flexible in that it allows us to consider spillovers from adjacent 
as well as distant regions, it facilitates the use of multiple distance measures (geographical 
distance, contiguity and common history in our case), and it is consistent with countries 
having different numbers of neighbors. The STAR model, in contrast, typically allows for 
only one type of spillover at a time, such as from contiguous regions, weighted by 
geographical distance or from regions that are culturally or linguistically close (see, for 
example, Table 3 in Becker et al., 2009). In case of contiguity, furthermore, it is common to 
normalize the sum of weights of all neighboring regions to unity so that the impact of a 
particular region on another depends on the number of other contiguous regions that the 
region in question has. 
Third, a potentially important drawback of the STAR model is that it introduces spatial lags 
(interactions between the variables of interest and the various distance measures used as 
weights) without also including the distance terms on their own. Finding, for example, that the 
spatial lag weighed by distance is negative may be driven by the fact that policies in other 
                                                 
18 Recent applications of this model in economics are Becker, Egger and Seidel (2009) and Bartz and Fuchs-
Schündeln (2012). See also the overview in Durlauf (2004).  
19 For example, taking the average spatial lag would imply that a combination of a high-reform and low-reform 
country has the same effect as two countries with intermediate reform. The advantage of considering individual 
realizations rather than their average would be even stronger when considering non-linear effects.  
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countries have a negative effect in general, without taking account of distance, that countries 
that are relatively remote implement less reform, or that the effect of other countries’ policies 
declines with distance. Without including the original terms as well as the interactions, these 
three possible explanations cannot be disentangled.  
A specific feature of our analysis is that although we consider all possible pairs of countries, 
we only observe the change of policies in each country and year rather than the actual 
informational spillover between the two countries. This implies that while we have 12-13 
thousand pairs of countries, we only have 580 unique observations of the reform progress (29 
countries and 20 years). OLS, therefore, would estimate the standard errors incorrectly (biased 
downwards). We therefore present regression results obtained with cluster-robust standard 
errors, with country-year combinations set as primary sampling units.  
Note, finally, that we carry out our analysis with policy indexes rather than with outcomes 
such as growth or inflation rates. Policy indexes assess whether particular policies were put in 
place. Implementing policy reform may be associated with an initial cost (temporary 
worsening of economic performance) followed by a subsequent improvement. For example, 
moderate inflation following a policy of price liberalization may be judged a success if the 
alternative outcome is run-away hyperinflation. Similarly, a recession in the wake of fiscal 
stabilization may be superior to a failed stabilization resulting in a sovereign default and a 
much deeper contraction.  
 
6. Results 
We consider two types of reform: economic and political one. The dependent variable is the 
log-difference (unless specified otherwise) of the respective index: economic reform or 
democracy. We account for distance using three different measures: actual geographic 
distance, dummy for contiguity (having a common land border between two countries), and 
having common history (being part of the same country, i.e. the former Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). We first introduce each distance measure on its own and 
then also run a regression with all three measures at the same time. We always enter the 
distance measure directly as well as interacted with the index of reform in country j.  
The results for democratization are summarized in Table 1 while those for economic 
liberalization are in Table 2. Columns (1) through (3) of each table present the results of 
estimating equation (13) with one distance measure at a time. Column (4), in turn, features all 
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three distance measures as well as the corresponding interaction terms. Overall, the results 
show strong support for our theoretical prediction in case of democratization and somewhat 
weaker support in case of economic liberalization. The lagged level of the reform index in 
country j is not consistently positive, indicating that spillovers, if any, indeed depend on 
distance. The coefficient for geographical distance (on its own, not interacted with a policy 
index) is negative, significantly so in the regressions for democracy. This can be interpreted 
as suggesting that countries that are relatively remote (i.e. those that are far from other 
countries in the sample) tend to reform their policies more slowly. The interaction between 
geographical distance and either reform index is negative, again significantly when we 
consider democracy: the impact of political liberalization in other countries declines with 
distance. The common border dummy is positive and significant in the regression for 
democracy while the same-country dummy is positive and significant for either index. Hence, 
countries that share borders or historical legacies with other countries tend to reform faster, 
especially with respect to democratization. This is similar to the negative effect of distance: 
countries that are relatively distant (geographically or culturally) tend to experience fewer 
spillovers than other countries. The interactions with the policy indexes reinforce this effect 
further: the spillovers in terms of political liberalization increase both with common border 
and common history, while only the latter appears important for economic liberalization.  
Looking at the remaining variables, the lagged level of either index in country i is always 
strongly significant and has a negative effect on further progress. This stems from the fact that 
both indexes are bound from above. Therefore, countries that have already achieved a 
relatively high degree of economic or political freedom can only experience incremental 
further progress. The effect of war in country i is negative and always very strongly 
significant: countries at war tend to postpone reform. In contrast, war in country j seems to 
matter little.  
One potential problem with our regression results is that it may be subject to a dynamic bias 
(Nickell, 1981).20 This is because the regression equation includes also the lagged own-reform 
index, yi,t-1, which features in the definition of the dependent variable, Δyi,t= yi,t-yi,t-1. Given 
that our goal is to identify the reform spillovers from other countries, the lagged own-reform 
index is not of particular importance for our analysis (we include mainly for methodical 
consistency). It is nevertheless possible that the coefficient of yi,t-1 is biased. In column (5) of 
both tables, therefore, we seek to address this problem by estimating the regression using the 
                                                 
20 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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generalized method of moments (GMM), with the second lag of the same index serving as the 
excluded instrument for the lagged own-reform index. The regression results are very similar 
to those in the preceding columns. The Hansen J statistic, however, suggests that the second 
lag of the relevant index cannot be excluded from the main regression equation. This is not 
surprising, given that both indexes are highly persistent over time and bound from above and 
below. However, our effort to find better instruments proved futile.21 Therefore, in column 
(6), we re-estimate equation (13) while omitting the lagged own-reform term, yi,t-1, and in 
column (7) we estimate an alternative model with the level of the reform index, yi,t, as the 
dependent variable while omitting the lagged index, yi,t-1. Both of these are restricted versions 
of our original model, as captured by equation (13), and both are by construction free of the 
dynamic bias. Again, the regression results are broadly similar to those in the preceding 
columns, suggesting the presence of spillovers in economic and political reform which depend 
on distance.  
 
7. Conclusions 
We address the question of what drives the apparent waves of political and economic changes 
that have been observed repeatedly throughout history. We argue that these waves reflect 
learning and resolution of uncertainty about the outcome of political and economic reforms, a 
phenomenon which we denote informational spillovers. Observing the outcome of reforms 
implemented elsewhere reduces uncertainty and helps voters and policy makers make better-
informed decisions. In this way, a successfully executed reform in one country increases the 
probability that other countries follow suit. Conversely, a reform effort that played out badly 
in one country would discourage similar reforms elsewhere.  
To illustrate this mechanism, we first formulate a simple model of reform spillovers. The 
model demonstrates that countries can reduce uncertainty about the reform outcome by 
observing the experience of other countries that implemented the same or similar reform 
earlier. This in turn should help reduce the status-quo bias highlighted in the previous 
literature.  
We test our model’s predictions on a sample of countries that implemented political and 
economic reforms during the 1990s and 2000s: the formerly communist countries in Central 
                                                 
21 We tried a quadratic polynomial of the time since the post-communist transition began (allowing different 
starting dates for different countries), as well as various measures of initial conditions interacted with this time 
index. As with the second lag of the reform index, the Hansen J statistic rejects these instruments.  
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and Eastern Europe. Since measuring the flow of information between two countries is 
difficult if not impossible, we instead relate progress in reform (political and economic alike) 
in one country to reforms implemented in other countries previously, and the distance to those 
countries. We find strong support for the presence of spillovers in reform, especially when 
considering democratization. We also confirm spillovers in economic liberalization, although 
here the results are somewhat weaker and less clear-cut. Our findings are thus in line with 
those of Meseguer (2006) and Gassebner et al. (2011), who find spillovers with respect to 
economic reform, Kelejian et al. (2013) and Faber and Gerritse (2012) whose analyses 
confirms spillovers in institutional development or Becker et al. (2009) who find them with 
respect to corruption. We believe nonetheless that we are the first to consider political 
changes. Interestingly, given the predominant emphasis on economic reform in the previous 
literature, our results suggest that spillovers are even more important in the political domain 
than with respect to economic policies.  
Our findings suggest that the experience of other countries plays an important role in 
mobilizing support and maintaining the momentum for reform. The fact that spillovers appear 
especially important with respect to political reform should not come as surprising. The 
success of political reform crucially hinges on the ability of the reformers to garner and 
maintain popular support for their cause. This is a standard collective action problem: while 
many would benefit from changes, few are willing to risk life and limb to make change 
happen if the outcome is highly uncertain. Observing successful democratizations in other 
countries helps reduce the uncertainty about the eventual outcome and thus reduces the 
underlying collective action problem. The recent events in the Middle East demonstrate this 
very clearly. Learning from the experience of others thus is an important way of breaking the 
status-quo bias.  
Besides informational spillovers, other external factors can play an important role too. The 
World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International 
Monetary Fund encouraged economic reforms in the post-communist countries by making 
participation in their programs conditional on satisfactory performance in economic policy 
making. The prospect of European Union membership, likewise, served as an important 
external driver of economic and political changes. Such external factors can complement and 
strengthen the role played by informational spillovers.  
An important contribution of our paper, in our view, is that we analyze neighborhood and 
local effects in the context of a gravity model rather than the more commonly used spatial 
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autoregressive model. Using the gravity model allows us to consider bilateral relationships 
between countries and to account for multiple types of distance (geography and contiguity 
and culture). It also makes it possible to consider whether the effect of other countries’ or 
regions’ characteristics depends on distance. In other words, we account for local effects with 
three or more terms (the other country’s characteristic, distance or multiple distance measures, 
and the various interaction terms) where the spatial model would use only one (spatial lag 
weighted by distance: geography or contiguity or culture). While the spatial model has proven 
very useful in the past, we believe it is important to provide an alternative.  
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Table 1 Spillovers with respect to Democratization  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: yi,t: 
yi,t-1 -.2967*** -.2962*** -.2961*** -.29689*** -.25492***   
(.0556) (.0556) (.0555) (.05560) (.00929)   
yj,t-1 .0786*** -.0020** -.0014* .06278* -.00890 .00174 .22594*** 
(.0270) (.0010) (.0007) (.03518) (.02644) (.03953) (.08303) 
Distance  -.0079***   -.00709** .00037 .00144 -.02965*** 
(.0029)   (.00366) (.00302) (.00438) (.00854) 
Contiguity  .0105**  .00002 .00729 -.00848 .01616 
 (.0046)  (.00573) (.00648) (.00596) (.01062) 
Same country   .0183*** .00833 .00896 .00749 -.00057 
  (.0072) (.00740) (.00742) (.00817) (.01307) 
yj,t-1*distij -.0106***   -.00859* .00090 .00041 -.032212*** 
 (.0037)   (.00463) (.00341) (.00527) (.01095) 
yj,t-1*contiguity  .0149**  -.00039 .01270* -.01480 .02966* 
  (.0066)  (.00885) (.00765) (.00905) (.01646) 
yj,t-1* smcntry   .0359*** .02285 .01733 .01377 .02370 
      (.0141) (.01448) (.01143) (.01616) (.02340) 
War i -.1837*** -.1832*** -.1832*** -.18350*** -.20001*** -.13394* -.29328*** 
(.0673) (.0673) (.0673) (.06725) (.01368) (.07417) (.08293) 
War j .0012 -.0001 .0019 .00241 .00158 .00183 .00286 
(.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.00178) (.00959) (.00205) (.00265) 
Constant .3469*** .2890*** .2903*** .34061*** -.12927*** .63168*** -.56426*** 
(.0906) (.0899) (.0900) (.08990) (.02286) (.11409) (.17851) 
R2  0.4477 0.4473 0.4475 0.4478 0.3352 0.2901 0.7643 
Observations 13,107 13,107 13,107 13,107 12,375 13,107 13,257 
PSUs 580 580 580 580  580 580 
Countries 29 29 29 29  29 29 
Years 20 20 20 20  20 20 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in logs, except dummy variables. The dependent variable is the log-difference of 
the variable indicated in the column heading.  
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Table 2 Spillovers with respect to Economic Reform  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: Δyi,t: yi,t: 
yi,t-1 -.3990*** -.3991*** -.3982*** -.39755*** -.44215***   
(.0473) (.0471) (.0471) (.04694) (.01087)   
yj,t-1 .0310 .0022 -.0008 .02393 .03452 .118678** -.23029*** 
(.0259) (.0016) (.0006) (.04229) (.02652) (.05473) (.06976) 
Distance  -.0029   -.00318 -.00351 -.01264** .02240*** 
(.0026)   (.00418) (.00307) (.00530) (.00652) 
Contiguity  -.0086  -.01787 -.00612 -.04166** .04282*** 
 (.0080)  (.01105) (.00661) (.01879) (.01467) 
Same country   .0200*** .02254*** .01062 .02859** -.01357 
  (.0064) (.00803) (.00882) (.01115) (.01638) 
yj,t-1*distij -.0041   -.00298 -.00465 -.01485** .02996*** 
 (.0035)   (.00550) (.00347) (.00698) (.00917) 
yj,t-1*contiguity  -.0086  -.02178* -.00961 -.049069** .04711*** 
  (.0092)  (.01322) (.00764) (.02205) (.01766) 
yj,t-1* smcntry   .0384*** .04333*** .01830* .06719** -.06351** 
      (.0121) (.01370) (.01059) (.02165) (.03064) 
War i -.3491*** -.3491*** -.3473*** -.34696*** -.33843*** -.27627*** -.43813*** 
(.0702) (.0702) (.0701) (.07000) (.01673) (.07389) (.10658) 
War j .0040 .0037 .0079*** .00858 .00509 .01517 -.01043** 
(.0025) (.0024) (.0031) (.00320) (.00957) (.00544) (.00516) 
Constant -.2100 -.2370 -.2130 -.18558 -.13050*** .69133*** -2.2545*** 
(.1528) (.1479) (.1467) (.14919) (.02388) (.19890) (.28482) 
R2  0.6068 0.6068 0.6075 0.6079 0.4759 0.3598 0.8328 
Observations 12,705 12,705 12,705 12,705 12,224 12,705 13,000 
PSUs 580 580 580 580  580 580 
Countries 29 29 29 29  29 29 
Years 20 20 20 20  20 20 
Country_FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year_FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All variables are in logs, except dummy variables. The dependent variable is the log-difference of 
the variable indicated in the column heading. 
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